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A number of concerns have been raised about the French economy following disappointing
economic ﬁgures in 2014. As part of our ‘economies of Europe’ series, Mathieu Plane assesses
the development of the French economy since the crisis and whether commentators are right to
regard France as the new ‘sick man of Europe’. He argues that while France remains highly
dependent on eﬀective policy action at the European level, there is more reason for optimism
concerning the economy in 2015 than is commonly recognised.
Last year was marked for France by the risk of European Commission sanctions for the failure of its
budget to comply with the Treaties; by the downgrading by the ratings agency Fitch of French government debt
(following a similar move by S&P a year earlier); by the absence of any sign of a drop in the unemployment rate; by
a rising deﬁcit after four years of consecutive decline; and by the distinction of having the worst current account
deﬁcit of comparable European countries. Economically, it seemed like the country’s worst year since the beginning
of the crisis in 2008.
France did not of course go through the kind of recession it did in 2009, when the Eurozone experienced a record
fall in GDP (-4.5 per cent and -2.9 per cent for the EMU and for France respectively). But for the ﬁrst time since the
subprime bubble burst, in 2014 French GDP grew more slowly (0.4 per cent) than the Eurozone average (0.8 per
cent). The country’s weakening position is fuelling the view that France may be the new sick man of Europe, a victim
of its leaders’ lax ﬁscal approach and its inability to reform. Is this really the case?
France: the sick man of Europe?
It is worth noting ﬁrst that the French economic and social model proved its eﬀectiveness during the crisis. France
weathered the crisis better than most of its European partners thanks to its system of social safety nets, a combined
(consumers, business, government) debt level that is lower than the Eurozone average, a household savings rate
that is higher than the Eurozone average, a low level of inequality, and a relatively solid banking system. Indeed,
between early 2008 and late 2013, French GDP grew by 1.1 per cent, while during that same period the Eurozone
as a whole contracted by 2.6 per cent; France also avoided the recession in 2012 and 2013 that most Eurozone
countries experienced.
Looking at Europe for the six years from 2008 to 2013, France’s economic performance was relatively close to that
of Germany (2.7 per cent), better than that of the UK (-1.3 per cent) and well ahead of Spain (-7.2 per cent) and Italy
(-8.9 per cent). Similarly, during this period investment in France contracted less than in the Eurozone as a whole
(‑7.7 per cent versus -17 per cent), and unemployment increased less (+3 points versus +4.6). Finally, the French
economy’s ability to stand up better to the crisis was not linked with a greater increase in public debt compared to
the Eurozone average (+28 GDP points for both France and the Eurozone) or even the United Kingdom (+43
points).
Nevertheless, France has seen its position in the Eurozone deteriorate in 2014. This was marked not only by lower
growth than its partners, but also by higher unemployment (the Eurozone rate has gradually fallen), an increase in
public debt (which virtually stabilised in the Eurozone), a decline in investment (which improved slightly in the
Eurozone), an increase in its public deﬁcit (while that of the Eurozone fell) and a substantial current account deﬁcit
(the Eurozone is running a signiﬁcant surplus). Why this divergence?
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While France does have a problem with competitiveness, it should be noted that almost half of its current account
deﬁcit is cyclical due to more dynamic imports than
its major trading partners, which generally have
worse output gaps. Furthermore, until 2013, the
country’s ﬁscal adjustment was focused more on the
tax burden than on public spending. Conversely, the
focus in 2014 was more on public spending. Given
France’s position in the business cycle and its budget
decisions, the ﬁscal multiplier in 2014 was higher
than in previous years, so that ﬁscal consolidation
imposed a heavy toll in terms of growth.
In terms of competitiveness, French industry is
caught in the middle of the Eurozone between, on the
one hand, peripheral countries of the euro area,
including Spain, which have entered into a spiral of
wage deﬂation fuelled by mass unemployment, and
the core countries, especially Germany, which are
reluctant to give up their excessive trade surpluses
through higher domestic demand and more inﬂation. Faced with the generalisation of wage devaluations in the
Eurozone, France had no choice but to respond with a policy to improve the competitiveness of its businesses by
cutting labour costs.
Thus, the CICE tax credit and the Pact of Responsibility represent a total transfer of 41 billion euros to the ﬁrm
system, mainly ﬁnanced by households. While the positive impact of these transfers will be felt over the medium-to-
long term, the ﬁnancing eﬀort together with the country’s ﬁscal consolidation eﬀort had an immediate adverse eﬀect
on purchasing power, which goes a long way toward explaining the poor growth performance of 2014. Finally, 2014
also saw a steep fall in housing investment (-7 per cent), the largest drop since the real estate crisis of the early
1990s (excluding 2009).
The French economy in 2015
There are several reasons why France’s poor performance is not likely to be repeated in 2015. First, in order to halt
the decline in construction, emergency measures were taken in August 2014 to free up housing investment, with the
ﬁrst eﬀects to be felt in 2015. Second, the programmes enacted to improve business competitiveness will begin to
take full eﬀect from 2015: the CICE tax credit and the Responsibility Pact will slash business costs by 17 billion
euros in 2015, up signiﬁcantly from only 6.5 billion in 2014.
Third, the slowdown in the ﬁscal consolidation programmes of France’s commercial partners and the introduction of
a minimum wage in Germany will both help French exports. In addition, the lower exchange rate for the euro and
falling oil prices are powerful levers for boosting the French economy in 2015, and together could amount to one
extra point of growth. Given the ECB’s policy on quantitative easing, interest rates should also remain low for
several more quarters. Finally, although timid, the Juncker plan along with marginal changes in Europe’s ﬁscal rules
will favour a pickup in investment. These factors will put some wind in the sails of French growth by helping to oﬀset
the negative impact of the reduction in public spending for 2015, so that the economy ﬁnally reaches a pace that will
be suﬃcient to begin to reverse the unemployment curve and reduce the public deﬁcit.
While France is not the sick man of Europe, it is nevertheless still very much dependent, like all Eurozone countries,
on Europe having strong macroeconomic levers. Up until now, these have had a negative impact on business, be it
through overly restrictive ﬁscal policies or a monetary policy that has proved insuﬃciently expansionary in light of
other central banks’ action. In an integrated currency zone, deﬂation cannot be fought on a national basis. The
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choice of a European policy mix that is more geared towards growth and inﬂation is a novel development since the
start of the sovereign debt crisis. Boosted by lower oil prices, let us hope that these levers will prove strong enough
to halt the depressive spiral that the Eurozone has been going through since the onset of the crisis. The recovery will
be European, before being French, or there won’t be one.
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Note: This article was cross-posted in French at the blog of the OFCE (French Economic Observatory – Sciences
Po) and gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London
School of Economics.
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